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Can SAMIDRC be spared the fate of previous peacekeeping missions?

Can SAMIDRC be spared the fate of previous peacekeeping missions?

Can SAMIDRC be spared the fate of previous peacekeeping missions?

SADC member states must ensure that the eastern DRC operation can overcome the challenges posed by its predecessors.

Nearly a year after deployment, prospects for success look bleak for the South African Development Community Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (SAMIDRC). Even with its direct offensive mandate, the mission could suffer the same fate as previous operations in eastern DRC.

Since 1999, the United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), the East African Community Regional Forces and the Armed Forces of the DRC (FARDC) have tried in vain to restore peace.

Instead, in the case of MONUSCO, their efforts are known for human rights violations and the failure to address local problems in an area plagued by more than 120 violent militias. This includes the rebel group M23, which has gained power in eastern DRC since 2012. A UN report In July it emerged that the group was backed by Rwandan and Ugandan forces – a claim both countries deny.

In May 2023, SADC authorized SAMIDRC to stabilize the region and give it an offensive mandate to engage in direct combat with armed groups. The mission’s target strength was 5,000 troops from Malawi, South Africa and Tanzania, but only 1,300 have been deployed.

SAMIDRC’s funding scheme reveals both the ambition and limitations of regional peacekeeping initiatives in Africa. The annual costs of the mission were estimated at US$500 million, with South Africa pledging US$100 million and the DRC US$200 million. While this shows regional ownership, the significant funding gap makes success difficult.

SAMIDRC’s target strength was 5,000 troops from Malawi, South Africa and Tanzania, but only 1,300 have been deployed

In support of SAMIDRC, the United Nations Security Council has authorized a partnership with MONUSCO on operations, intelligence sharing and technical cooperation. SAMIDRC can leverage MONUSCO’s established infrastructure, including vital logistical and military capabilities, especially air assets that enable medical evacuations.

Despite this support, SAMIDRC – like previous missions – has not made sufficient progress in stabilizing the region.

SAMIDRC’s rules of engagement ensure the necessary balance between offensive and defensive actions and civil protection. However, funding shortfalls and the lack of troops and equipment are hampering operations, as happened with MONUSCO and the East African Defense Force. As a result, SAMIDRC has difficulty identifying and responding to immediate threats (where armed groups integrate into civilian areas) and reclaiming territory.

In contrast, M23 has gained control of strategic locations such as Masisi and Rutshuru, causing many civilians to flee. Rebel groups have also been guilty of gross human rights violations violations including murder, sexual violence and plunder, with women and children most affected.

The violent conflict has displaced more than two million people in the country in the first half of 2024 alone, according to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center. reports. According to Human Rights Watch, Rwandan troops are fighting alongside M23 to have ‘indiscriminately shelled displaced persons camps’ around Goma in 2024. These serious violations include killing more than 1,800 children recruited by rebel groups in the past year.

Concerns about SAMIDRC’s capabilities are compounded by questions about its legitimacy. The SADC has been called ‘reckless’ for deploying troops in the face of major capacity constraints. While accurate numbers are hard to come by, the mission already has been costs the lives of more than 15 soldiers, with more captured by M23 rebels this year.

Concerns about SAMIDRC’s capabilities are compounded by questions about its legitimacy

Rwanda opposite the lack of consultation in the deployment of the troops. It asked the African Union to withhold its support for SAMIDRC, arguing that its presence would escalate tensions in the conflict.

At a September workshop organized by the Institute for Security Studies, local civil society groups and communities in eastern DRC also questioned SAMIDRC’s ability to manage the complex dynamics of the conflict.

“For the people of Goma, there is also the problem of the multitude of all these regional forces deployed on Congolese soil,” said a workshop participant. ‘People wonder how many foreign armies will still be in the country. This discredits confidence in the… FARDC. Many reject the increased presence of foreign armies.”

Allegations of sexual misconduct also undermine the mission’s credibility. Recently reports suggest that SAMIDRC personnel have impregnated local women, with claims that soldiers have paid ‘divorce fees’ to avoid being charged or sanctioned. These reports follow a historyry of sexual exploitation and misconduct by peacekeepers in the country, and demonstrate that security is not linked to sustainable humanitarian and development initiatives.

The conflict reflects a complex web of competing interests over the country’s resources, involving a range of armed groups and national and regional players. This makes SAMIDRC’s task challenging, just like MONUSCO and other missions.

SADC member states have failed to ensure full force deployment and address structural problems

In the case of SAMIDRC, SADC member states have failed to ensure full force deployment and address structural problems. MONUSCO support is not enough to compensate for inadequate finances, infrastructure and personnel – without which the force has little chance of success against well-armed rebel groups and Rwandan forces.

To address some of these issues, SAMIDRC has deployed a Mission Training Team to ensure interoperability of the armed forces during joint operations with the DRC Army. Although SAMIDRC acts as a coordination center, its success depends on all actors working with MONUSCO, local communities and civil society organizations.

Without urgently addressing the problems, SAMIDRC will likely end up on the list of failed interventions in eastern DRC. The force must be strengthened to its full target strength, and SADC and its Member States must ensure adequate resources, equipment and training. This requires dialogue and the remobilization of support for the mission.

It is also worth considering whether SAMIDRC’s mandate should include humanitarian, development and peacebuilding efforts.

On the ground, SAMIDRC leaders must ensure compliance with justice and accountability mechanisms regarding misconduct and sexual exploitation of vulnerable groups. The mission should work with local governments, civil society actors and communities to understand their concerns while promoting cooperation.

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