Big Changes Expected in the Ukrainian War – Xiao Bin

Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov’s surprise visit to China and the BRICS Summit held in Kazan, Russia, on 22-24 October, once again brought the Ukrainian war to the world’s agenda. Belousov described Russia-China military cooperation as a critical global and regional equalizer. In keeping with the rhythm of military diplomacy, the BRICS Summit is the largest intergovernmental multilateral conference organized by Russia since February 2022. The summit deepened Western concerns that international division would continue and that the BRICS countries could become a tool to balance the G7 club. Russia’s war efforts to resolve the crisis, domestic problems in the United States and other Western countries, and Ukraine’s limited military power could lead to major changes in the war.

Changing war targets

Ukraine’s desire to join NATO and its territorial issues are two major obstacles to achieving peace. Conditions are changing for both. The direct reason for this is Finland’s nascent membership in NATO. The distance from Finland to Moscow is almost the same as the distance from Ukraine to Moscow, and from the Finnish border to Russia’s second largest city, St. It is only 150 kilometers from St. Petersburg.

Although there is no radical change in Russia’s stance on Ukraine’s accession to NATO, a different voice has emerged on whether NATO expansion is a problem. It is argued that if NATO expansion were an issue for Russia, Finland and Sweden would pose no less of a threat than Ukraine. This new thinking may have triggered the “land for peace” proposal through Russia’s agent in the West; Russia accepted Ukraine’s NATO membership in exchange for Ukraine’s acceptance of territorial losses. However, Ukraine rejected the interim discussion and insisted on the restoration of its 1991 post-Soviet borders. Michal Smetana, director of the Peace Research Center in Prague, believes that a growing number of Ukrainians support territorial concessions in exchange for NATO membership. NATO has always emphasized the timing factor for Ukraine, so this can be negotiated with Russia.

War fatigue in the West

Peter the Great brought Russia into the European world, so Russia has been doing business with European countries for over 340 years. So it has much more knowledge of the Western world than most other countries, and a wealth of diplomatic experience in fighting Europeans. Russia has achieved remarkable results in the ongoing hybrid war against the West. First, it successfully launched an anti-Western movement in the Western periphery such as New Caledonia, Zimbabwe, Georgia and Iran.

Russia is also presenting itself as the new global anti-colonial pioneer among countries in the South, especially in Africa. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairman Dmitry Medvedev wrote an article last June about the West’s obsession with political control over other parts of the world and domination of the international scene. He called for a global anti-colonial movement for the freedom of nations.

Second, Russia exploited internal frictions within the West and financed far-right European parties to undermine support for Ukraine; Particular attention was paid to Russia-friendly or anti-Ukrainian aid parties. The Alternative for Germany Party and Bundnis Sahra Wagenknecht boycotted Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s speech in the Bundestag. The European Conservatives and Reformists Party and the Identity and Democracy Party, which hold 18 percent of the seats in the European Parliament, oppose European support for Ukraine. In addition, far-right parties in Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, France and other countries also oppose sanctions against Russia. In response to Western allies’ war fatigue, Zelenskyy made frequent visits and speeches to counter Russian public aggression and replaced nine senior government officials, including the foreign minister, to consolidate Western support and boost morale at home.

2025 is probably the key

Ending the war by 2025 is a goal of Zelenskyy’s “Victory Plan.” Russia does not see any role for Zelenskyy in the future course of the war. It is undeniable that the longer the war lasts, the more variables there will be. With this in mind, Zelenskyy may change his hardline stance and seek more pragmatic ways to end the war, such as a ceasefire conditional on membership in NATO or the European Union. The Russian Foreign Ministry has said it rejects such a plan, and Ukraine is also aware of this, but its demand for the 1991 border will not be fulfilled due to a massive and efficient counter-offensive in 2025. For the United States, although Ukraine has repeatedly asked for a change of cautious tone, the risk of war escalation is much greater than the risk posed in the Middle East. In this context, the United States did not lift restrictions on Ukraine’s use of Western weapons. As of October 16, the United States had provided 67 tranches of military equipment that did not meet the quantity and quality requirements for a major counterattack.

Even if a ceasefire is reached in 2025, the security crisis in Europe may last for many years due to Russia’s refusal to accept its position in the international system. It will certainly seek to establish a “new security cooperation framework” in Eurasia and lead the anti-colonial movement in the South. Russia’s relations with the West will remain fragile and contentious.