The ceasefire talks in Sudan: what has been missing so far?

The war in Sudan has claimed tens of thousands of lives and resulted in one of the most in the world urgent humanitarian emergencieswith more than 10 million people displaced and more than 2 million facing hunger. On April 15, 2023, fighting began between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), led by Mohamed Hamdan “Hemedti” Dagalo. So far, the international community has mainly pushed for ceasefire negotiations between the country’s warring parties, although these have been largely fruitless.

The May 2023 peace talks, hosted by the United States and Saudi Arabia, stalled after both sides failed to implement an agreed statement of principles – the “Jeddah Declaration.” The United States, Saudi Arabia and Switzerland launched renewed negotiations aimed at a ceasefire and humanitarian access in Geneva in August 2024, involving Egypt, the UAE, the African Union and the United Nations as observers. Although the RSF sent a delegation, the SAF did not, demanding that the RSF go to cantonments before resuming negotiations. As a result, Geneva turned to proximity talks, and while it made commitments to facilitate greater humanitarian access, no progress was made on a ceasefire.

The US, Germany, France and the EU organized one ministerial meeting on Sudan on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, but progress on a ceasefire remains unlikely as both SAF and RSF believe they can secure victory over the other with both solid and sustained external support . To achieve peace, it is crucial to review what is missing from previous talks to make progress towards a stable, safe and secure future for the Sudanese people.

Identifying an endgame for Hemedti, Burhan and their supporters

The general assumption in ceasefire negotiations is that a ceasefire must be negotiated between the warring parties. That may be true, but in the case of the ongoing war in Sudan, it is difficult to imagine that the two warring sides would conclude, let alone implement, a ceasefire agreement without first having a clear understanding of what the political and personal would be the endgame.

Defining an endgame essentially involves addressing the fears, concerns, and expectations of Sudan’s armed protagonists and their external backers. It is also about dealing with thorny issues such as accountability, security sector reform and the role of the warring parties in a future governance structure. Most Sudanese citizens, apart from the Islamists of the former regime, insist that the military should not be part of future political institutions. But that raises the question of how to convince military leaders to play a constructive role in supporting a democratic transition rather than opposing it.

In the absence of a coherent civilian camp, it is important to consider alternative ways and means to involve them in the peace talks.

Accommodating the military on both sides of the conflict also means dealing with their civilian supporters, who are equally concerned about their place and role in future institutions of governance. For example, Islamists and supporters of the former regime advocate the continuation of the war and oppose any deal that would take them out of the political balance. There are equally deep divisions within the democratic civilian camp when it comes to rewarding the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Islamists for their crimes by allowing them to be part of talks that would decide the future of the country. However, excluding them will not mean an end to the fighting.

Involving ‘middle powers’ in the peace process

Since the outbreak of hostilities, the US has failed to convince regional states that fueling the conflict in Sudan is detrimental to their interests in Sudan. The US and Saudi Arabia initially hosted the peace talks in Jeddah without paying due attention to the regional dynamics affecting the situation in Sudan. They have become aware of the need for greater inclusivity.

They shouted the Manama talks in early 2024, which also included Egypt, the UAE, the AU and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). That forum reportedly made notable progress on some of the thorniest issues, but that effort was scuttled by disagreements within the ranks of the SAF’s Port Sudan government and its Islamist allies.

The recent talks in Geneva also involved key regional players. However, the regional picture is becoming increasingly complicated due to the involvement of a growing number of regional players such as Iran, Turkey, Qatar and, further afield, Russia and Ukraine. Reconciliation between all these external actors is unlikely, but ignoring their interests will result in continued support for conflict and suffering in Sudan.

Giving citizens a meaningful place in the negotiations

The best scenario would be for citizens to have a full seat at the negotiating table. Leaving aside the SAF’s opposition to involving civilians in the talks, the question remains: which civilians?

In the absence of a coherent civilian camp, it is important to consider alternative ways and means to involve them in the peace talks. One option is to convene a civilian negotiating forum simultaneously with the military forum and create opportunities for discreet exchanges between the two. Another possibility is to organize a diverse group of citizens who would play the role of ‘Resource Persons’ or ‘Friends of the Mediators’ to provide advice, help smooth over disagreements and address controversial issues.

Unless the above shortcomings are adequately addressed, the prospects for peace arising from renewed negotiations will remain slim.