NATO vs. Russia: how to ensure conflict is avoided

After the conflict in Ukraine, the best solution is competitive coexistence: Being a great power is at the heart of Russian national identity. Even when Russia was weak compared to its rivals, Russian leaders still believed that their country was a great power, only temporarily unlucky. They did what they could to strengthen Russia’s prerogatives as a great power on the world stage. That’s exactly what Vladimir Putin did after coming to power a quarter of a century ago amid economic collapse and political chaos in Russia. He has done this largely by opposing what he sees as U.S.-led efforts to undermine the foundations of Russian power.

For this reason, the outcome of Russia’s war with Ukraine, whether victory or defeat, is unlikely to cause Putin or his successors to abandon their strategic ambitions, although he may change his tactics. Three events that could change this assessment: a democratic breakthrough, the collapse of Russia or its economic collapse. These are all distant possibilities.

Rather, Russia is likely to remain a recognizable version of its historical self: authoritarian in its internal political structure, expansive in its foreign policy impulses, lagging economically and technologically behind the world’s leading powers, and yet determined to play the role of a great power. To achieve its goals, it will retain vast assets, including one of the world’s largest nuclear arsenals, significant space and cyber capabilities, the world’s largest natural resources, and a permanent seat on the UN Security Council with veto power. As a result, Russia will remain a serious challenge to the United States and NATO.

To maintain or strengthen its position as a great power and guarantee its security, a post-conflict Russia will almost certainly try to push the military threat it believes emanates from Europe as far from its border as possible. This will put persistent pressure along the long NATO/Russia border, which will stretch from the Barents Sea to the Black Sea until arms control measures ease the pressure, which is unlikely for at least the next decade.

Russia will also use cyber tools, covert actions and preferential treatment for certain European states in a continuing effort to delay, if not reverse, the consolidation of a European political entity that would dwarf Russia in population, wealth and power potential to a greater extent than the United States that’s what they have today.

However, the inevitable tension does not condemn the United States and NATO to intense, adversarial relations with Russia, which is always teetering on the brink of direct military confrontation. Mutually agreed coexistence is possible, even if it is competitive. Achieving this end state will require the United States and NATO to balance deterrence and diplomacy, containment and engagement in their policies toward Russia.

While maintaining a strong deterrent posture, NATO members should restore normal diplomatic relations with Russia to engage on shared interests, such as climate change, and manage ongoing disputes, for example over security arrangements. NATO members should gradually ease sanctions to enable the restoration of mutually beneficial trade and people-to-people exchanges. They should even allow Russia to re-enter energy markets, provided barriers are put in place to prevent over-dependence.

Moreover, NATO members should implement arms control measures similar to those signed after the end of the Cold War to ease tensions on the border.

This end state is far from the ideal of strategic partnership that tempted Western and Russian leaders after the end of the Cold War. But this is perhaps the best possible outcome in a rapidly emerging world of intensely competing global and regional powers.

About the author:

Thomas Graham, a distinguished fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, was senior Russia director on the National Security Council staff during the George W. Bush administration.

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